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Introduction
When we think about the cost of a child we usually think about goods for the child, school expenditures, health care expenditures, etc. The cost of children, however, can be considered not only in terms of expenditures on goods and services, required for a child, but also in terms of a loss of the part of total family earnings. The opportunity cost of a child may be more important for women than for men due to their greater involvement in the child caring process. Moreover, only women can give a birth to children, therefore they are the ones who take most of the additional costs related to pregnancy and childcare. Maternity can have a negative impact on women opportunities in the labor market not only through the decrease of hours devoted to work, but also through the career interruptions, loss of human capital while child caring, and smaller mobility compared to women without children. Many theoretical and empirical papers state that children are associated with women's inferior performance in the labor market.
Another potential source of women's weaker performance at the labor market is discrimination against women. Employers can prefer to pay lower salary to both women with children as well as to childless women. The presence of children may signal to employers about females' potentially lower productivity. While absence of children may signal about a woman's future separation from the workplace with the purpose of raising a child.
After the collapse of the USSR, the total fertility rate has dropped in Ukraine dramatically reaching the lowest level of 1.1 in [2001] [2002] . Figure 1 shows the crude birth rate dynamics of the entire period considered. Combined with the significant out migration following the demise of iron curtain, this has led to a negative rate of population growth throughout the 1990s and onwards.
This inspired the ongoing policy debate within the country calling for government measures to address the issue of the lowest low fertility. In spite of the complexity of the fertility decision 3 mechanisms, the one and only pro-natalist policy pursued by the Ukrainian government has been the so-called baby bonus. 2 This bonus over the course of 1990s had been set at the extremely low level, but had been increased several times to a considerable degree over the course of 2000s. Table 1 shows the evolution of this policy. The significance of the increases and the burden for the state budget called for the analysis of the impact of these fiscal measures on the fertility decisions. Yet, no rigorous evaluation of this pro-natalist policy has been undertaken. Albeit a recent study by Sologoub (2013) shows virtually no effect of income on fertility decisions in Ukraine. At the same time this study finds some evidence in support of the importance of child-related infrastructure, such as childcare availability.
Another kind of pro-natalist policies is the maternity leave -an employee benefit which provides paid or unpaid leave from the job and guarantees the job place availability at the end of it. The changes to this benefit in Ukraine are described in Table 2 .
Both the baby bonus and the maternity leave benefit are intended to decrease the cost of raising a child and it is important to understand the degree of the compensation by taking into account not only actual costs of baby's food and clothes, education and healthcare, but also the opportunity cost of parental time, especially that of mothers. For example, as was stated by Crittenden, the author of famous book "The Price of Motherhood", in the US an average couple that consists of two equally capable parents with high education and total income of $80,000 per year could lose more than 1 million dollars of lifetime income if they have at least one child.
Clearly, even after adjustment for the cost-of-living and income differences, the amount of the baby bonus cannot fully compensate families for the childbirth. Moreover, this may not be needed.
Most people decide to have children taking into account other aspects of this matter, not only 2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baby_bonus 4 material considerations. Similarly, the way the government pursues its pro-natalist goal should probably also include some non-material measures. From the point of view of an employer, mothers who stay at home with their small children may be unproductive, but from the point of view of the society and the whole economy, by educating and rearing their children mothers contribute to the human capital that will be important for future economic growth. These are the concepts, which are difficult to quantify, but ignoring them may lead to substantial inefficiencies in the labor markets, when equally qualified and motivated females with children are paid less than their childless counterparts.
The literature on the motherhood wage penalty has been quite rich, estimating the effect of children on female wages in various countries and/ or contexts. The largest motherhood wage penalty of about 20% has been estimated for the United States (Waldfogel 1997 (Waldfogel , 1998a (Waldfogel , 1998b Baum 2002 , Budig and England 2001 , Loughran and Zissimopoulos 2009 , Lundberg and Rose 2000 . This followed by the estimates for UK (Waldfogel 1995 (Waldfogel , 1998a , Canada (Drolet 2002), Germany (Buligescu et al. 2009 ), and Australia (Livermore, Rodgers, and Siminski 2010), with the lowest or zero effect found in Denmark (Gupta and Smith 2002) and Sweden (Albrecht et al. 1999) . These previous findings suggest the importance of institutional settings in the direct impact of children on female wages after controlling for various human capital characteristics, such as experience, tenure, and education, which are related to child-bearing decisions. It seems like the overall focus on family values and promotion of equal family roles between genders may be contributing to the decrease in the direct motherhood wage penalty, and, thus, to a decrease of true cost of having children.
Understanding the existence and extent of the motherhood wage penalty in Ukraine is important for several reasons. One is that Ukraine represents an academically interesting context where to study the motherhood wage penalty. On the one hand, it has probably the most de facto 5 liberal labor market environment where the employers do not bear any responsibility for discriminating against women/mothers, even though there is a de jure provision for secured rights of pregnant women and mothers. This is achieved through an informal arrangement either as a promise taken at the start of a job to leave the position once a woman is pregnant, or a provision of an undated letter requesting quit at "own will", which the employer uses once the "threat of pregnancy" becomes a reality. The second reason is that it is very policy relevant. Over the course of late 90s -2000s several attempts have been made to increase the baby bonus dramatically, yet resulting in no noticeable impact on overall fertility with some evidence pointing to the shifting of the timing of birth by those who would have the same number of children no matter what the policy is. Potentially, this indicates that there is a factor not taken into account by policy makers, which may be misleading their choices of policy measures. Finally, due to the change in the economic system and the following devaluation of previously accumulated human capital, Ukraine provides an interesting case study to document whether this human capital is useful in protecting against the adverse impact of having a child. Combined with the timing of the first birth effect, these findings could inform further pro-natalist policy making concerning better targeting of the government initiatives. This paper is devoted to the analysis of the effect of children on women's earnings, investigating whether motherhood has significant negative impact on labor market performance in Ukraine. We specifically choose to control for various human capital characteristics and study the direct impact of having a child and the number of children on female hourly wages. Partially this is to avoid the issue of endogenity arising from the choice between continued working and leaving the job being related to the hourly wages. And partially to draw attention to the need for policy measures promoting motherhood as socially valuable and providing infrastructure for women to successfully combine jobs and child caring responsibilities, as this setup leaves two explanations 6 for the direct effect of children -effort allocation and discrimination, which can be addressed by corresponding policy measures.
Constructing the panel data from the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS) for the period 1997-2004 and estimating the fixed effect model, we find motherhood wage penalty of approximately 20%. Females with only one child earn 6.5% less than females without children, and females with two or more children earn approximately 13.3% less. Thus, the wage penalty for each additional child is approximately 6.5%. This is close to the US estimates by Waldfogel (1997 Waldfogel ( , 1998a Waldfogel ( , 1998b .
The evidence suggests that the wage penalty for motherhood is different for females with different levels of education, and is the highest for low skilled females. However, the variation in the penalty across the education groups differs depending on the timing of first birth. Thus, low educated females receive 15% wage premium if they delay motherhood until the age of 30, and suffer the most if they give first birth between 20 and 25 years old. The wage penalty for motherhood for females with vocational/professional education disappears if they have first birth after age 20. For highly educated females, the evidence is mixed because the effects of high education and timing have different directions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the previous literature concerning family wage gap and women's performance in the labor market following the childbirth. The underlying methodology is presented in Section 3, and data description -in Section 4. Estimation results as well as econometric issues pertinent to the current analysis are discussed in Section 5, followed by the Conclusions. 
Literature Review
Labor market aspects of motherhood are reflected in economic literature in terms of theories of time allocation (Becker, 1965) and human capital (Mincer, 1958) . These economic approaches build on the contemporary aspects of the woman`s life-time surrounding pregnancy, childbirth, and further child rearing. Motherhood is associated with re-allocation of time, lower investment in human capital, and even with deterioration of human capital due to career interruptions, changes in productivity and work effort, and changes in preferences for specific job amenities. Moreover, it is often claimed that in addition to objective constraints of motherhood, there is still an evidence of discrimination, mostly statistical.
Motherhood is usually associated with lower investment in human capital. Changes in time allocation within the household have given rise to a wide set of literature, which measures cost of children in terms of time and money (Millimet 2000 , Craig 2007 ). This idea is simply illustrated by Becker`s theory (1965) -after a childbirth, women substitute labor market production into time spent with family. Such re-allocation of time shortens educational period and prevents females from further on-the-job investments in human capital when this option competes for the time with children. Life-cycle investment profiles of mothers are not monotonic. Therefore, this distinguishes them from men and childless women during pre-maternal, childbearing and child rearing periods. Mothers, on average, invest less, and, child rearing may have an effect on the rate of depreciation of human capital . As a result, the experience-wage profile may differ between mothers and non-mothers as suggested in Figure 2 .
With a global upward trend in the age at first birth, researchers started investigating the impact of this on human capital accumulation and wages. Pregnancy in young years lowers investment in education (Fletcher and Wolfe 2008, Lang and Ashcraft 2010) and experience.
Mature motherhood, while having less severe impact (Blackburn, Bloom and Neumark, 1990), 8 still leads to shorter work experience. On the other hand, career interruption for females who have accumulated sufficient work experience before becoming mothers imply higher opportunity cost of time out of the labor market (Anderson, Binder and Krause 2002) . Drolet (2002) finds that women who have first childbirth later in life earn 6% more than those who have first child earlier.
Almuendo- Dorates and Kimmel (2004) investigate the importance of education and delaying of childbirth in the US and find that college-educated women who delayed motherhood beyond 30 earned 21% more.
Every now and then researchers mention one more component of the wage penalty for motherhood -the decrease in productivity -rooted in Becker's theory of "Human Capital, efforts and sexual division of labor" (1985) . Becker claims that marriage and children have an important impact on career performance of women. In particular, "married women spend less effort on each hour of market work than married men, working the same number of hours with the same market human capital". Empirical testing of this hypothesis is rather difficult due to the lack of cases when productivity can directly be measured. In professional sports, however, earnings are determined by performance, that is, by productivity. Kalist (2008) 
study of The Ladies Professional Golf
Association support the human-capital explanation and Becker's effort hypothesis of the family gap by showing that, indeed, productivity of women starts falling as soon as they become mothers.
On the contrary, no significant difference is found between mothers and non-mothers in academia in terms of publishing (Cole and Zuckerman 1987, Fox 2005) . These two results concerning scientists and sportswomen provide an illustration of potentially possible outcomes, but can hardly be generalized to the whole population.
Another labor market aspect is that due to objective constraints tied to childcare period, women search for jobs with special amenities, and therefore, may agree to lower wages. Studies based on German data show that motherhood wage penalty decreases by almost 10% 9 if the question is considered in the framework of Compensating Wage Differentials Theory (Felfe 2006 ).
An interesting set of literature is focusing on the direct impact of children on female wages after controlling for various human capital characteristics. This specification when finding motherhood wage penalty can be consistent with both Becker's effort allocation theory and discriminations against mothers. This literature is vast with the motherhood wage penalty found in USA (Anderson, Binder and Krause 2002 , 2003 , Baum 2002 , Budig and England 2001 , Loughran and Zissimopoulos 2009 , Lundberg and Rose 2000 , Taniguchi 1999 , Waldfogel 1997 1998a) , in Britain (Waldfogel 1995 , 1998a , Viitanen 2004 ), Canada (Drolet, 2002 and Germany This finding indicates the potential existence of motherhood wage penalty as the differential is averaged across all women -mothers and childless women. This paper adds to the literature by providing the analysis of labor market performance of mothers in a country with de jure very family friendly policies but de facto arrangements which allow for discrimination. The existence and magnitude of motherhood wage penalty is importance to know for Ukraine a country with the lowest low fertility and a continuing policy struggle to fight de-population. We specifically focus on the impact of children on female wages after controlling for various human capital characteristics, such as education, actual experience, and time out of the labor market. Although, knowing the pathways through which having a child affects female wages is very important, the focus on the direct effect allows us to draw policy recommendations which may be more efficient than the currently used pro-natalist baby bonuses.
Methodology
We start with female wages determined by the human capital model: have a child and when to have a child, such as productivity or willingness to work. To account for individual time fixed unobserved heterogeneity we use fixed effects model.
Another problem that arises in such application is the sample selection. Sample of workers may not be a random sample of the whole population, and non-workers should be taken into account too (Heckman 1979) . The traditional approach to correct for self-selectivity bias due to not observing information about wages of non-working women is the Heckman sample selection model (Tobit II model). The idea of this methodology is to include the inverse Mill's ratio as an additional explanatory variable into regression. The inverse Mill's ratio ("lambda") is computed based on the probit regression of the probability of women's participation in the labour force for each year separately.
where i h -is dummy variable equal to one if a woman is employed and zero otherwise. If explanatory variables in employment status regression and wage regression are the same, the model is only identified through the fact that inverse Mills ratio is a nonlinear function. If the variation in "lambda" is small, the relationship between lambda and it Z is close to linear.
Therefore inclusion of additional variables in it Z can improve the identification of the second step (Verbeek 2000, p. 217) .
In many applications sample selection and individual specific unobserved heterogeneity issues occur simultaneously. Some estimators have been proposed which deal with both sources of estimation bias, producing consistent results under different assumptions. proposes an estimator that requires specifying the functional form of the conditional mean of the individual effects in the equation of interest. The other two estimators impose some distributional assumptions on the error terms (Rochina-Barrachina 1999) and the fixed effects (Kyriazidou 1997) 13 in the equation of interest. Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina (2000) apply the three methods mentioned above to the estimation of wage equation for female labor market participants, verifying the impact of actual labor market experience on wages. The authors also provide an extensions of these estimators to face other econometric problems such as non-strict exogeneity and/or time constant non-linear errors in variables. Given the data availability, we use the estimation procedure proposed by . Selection equation is estimated following the Chamberlain's random effect probit model where
. Then the inverse Mill's ratio it ˆ is added to the fixed effect estimation using selected sample of employed women (
One of the major concerns in most studies of the effect of children on labor market outcomes for mothers is endogeneity of such explanatory variables as marriage, motherhood, experience and tenure in the wage equation. Korenman and Neumark (1992) explore these econometric issues in a cross-sectional analysis of marriage, motherhood and earnings. They perform their analysis using the data set from the National Longitudinal Surveys 1968. Their main findings are that the OLS estimation produces biased results due to unobserved individual specific heterogeneity and they find an evidence that experience and tenure are endogenous while marital status and number of children are exogenous in the wage equation. Moreover, in their research standard sample-selection estimation shows no evidence of selection to labor market bias. They find a 7% wage decrease for one child and 22% for two or more children. The authors suggest that family background variables such as parent's occupation and parent's years of education or level of education of the mother can be used as instruments for experience and tenure.
Taking into account previous findings and suggested procedures we will proceed according to the following algorithm: (i) Pooled OLS model, (ii) OLS corrected for selectivity into labor market, (iii) FE estimation, and (iv) FE estimation corrected for selectivity into labor market. In addition, using the preferred specification, we will explore whether the estimates of the motherhood wage penalty differ across different educational groups and depending on the age at first birth.
Data
For the investigation of a child impact on mothers' labor performance in Ukraine the panel data from Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS) is analyzed. The sample consists of two waves of the ULMS which is a nationally representative sample of Ukrainian households. 
Sample construction
Using both the reference week data and retrospective information, we construct a panel Second, 1986 wages are reported in USSR rubbles and 1991 wages -in coupons, which need to be brought to real terms, of course. There is rather precise information about inflation for [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] 3 , while inflation between 1986, 1991 and 2004 is hard to measure correctly. Moreover, the basket of goods and services for calculation of CPI changed several times during this period.
Finally and most importantly, we do not have retrospective information on children in the household. We are bound to assume that the child living with the mother in 2003 lived with her all the time since he/she was born. Likewise, if the mother does not have a child living with her, we assume that even if she gave birth to a child, the child has not lived with her and thus has no effect on her wages.
To avoid a division bias, hourly wage rate is calculated following Kimmel and Kniesner (1998) . Monthly wage is divided by 40 if a person reports that she works not less than 25 hours per week and divided by 20 if she works less than 25 hours per week. The obtained values must then be also divided by the average number of weeks in a month (52/12)
The ULMS data set allows constructing a data set for females that contains 31398 personyear observations, 28018 of which are for working aged (15-65 years old). Approximately one-half of these females are employed. The final pooled data set contains 10413 observations, which is approximately 2300 observations per year. AS could be seen, female wages in different educational groups follow similar time trend with a clear upward shift by education.
Sample Description
Descriptive statistics for the pooled sample is provided in Table 3 . 83% of the entire sample ever had a child, 51.4% of which are employed, and 89% of employed mothers are employed full time. The average age is 41 years, while the average age of ever mothers is 44 years. Mothers have on average higher potential work experience as well as actual work experience and higher tenure.
However, mothers on average receive lower wages than women who never gave birth to a child.
This can be explained by the fact that the subsample of the childless women is younger. So these females are childless not because of their decision but because they are rather young to become mothers. Only 17% of childless females are married, while 71% of mothers are married.
It should be pointed out that the average number of children living with their mothers is equal to 0.8. That can be explained by the fact that our sample is built from the retrospective part 
Results

Estimation of the wage penalty of motherhood
Estimates from the basic model for working age females (15-65 years old) are shown in The sample we use includes only those individuals for which we observe wages, i.e.
employed individuals, which might produce biased results (Heckman 1979) . For example, a woman who is less productive in the job market, but more productive in the household, will face lower wages and will be more likely to have more children. So, these women choose not to work. Not taking them into account may lead to the underestimation of the motherhood wage penalty (find it being less negative). Column (2) presents the second stage results from the Heckman Selection procedure. This Inverse Mills Ratio comes from the first stage based on the probit regression of female participation in the labor market with the same explanatory variables as in the OLS regression plus a dummy for the presence of an infant in the family, all marital status variables and excluding tenure in order to improve the identification of the second step (Verbeek, 2004, p. 217) . After adding of inverse Mills ratio into the pooled OLS regression, the estimated effect children almost does not change. Moreover, coefficient of inverse Mills ratio is insignificant (p-value = 0.370). That means that there is no evidence of a sample selection bias, which is consistent with the findings in Gupta and Smith (2001) , Waldfogel (1998) , and Korenman and Newmark (1990) 
Heterogeneity bias
The OLS and Heckman Selection Procedure allow controlling only for observable characteristics, while there might be individual specific time invariant unobserved characteristics (such as ability, work-related preferences, wiliness to work, etc.) that also have an impact on females' wages. As a result, the OLS estimates may be biased because of other omitted test of fixed effects versus random effects which has suggested that random effects is not appropriate (chi-sq statistics = 48.61).
6
Although the test with the OLS model has provided no evidence of selection bias, this may be different in the panel setting. Therefore, we apply sample selection correction procedure to the fixed effects estimator (Wooldridge 2002, Chapter 17 .7) in order to address the issue of the bias associated with self-selection into labor market controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity. Column (4) of Table 4 presents results of fixed effect estimation with additional term -"lambda" (Inverse Mills Ratio). IMR is estimated from the Chamberlain's random effect probit model with the same explanatory variables as in fixed effect regression excluding tenure and adding dummy variable for the presence of infant in the family, all marital status variables and all averages (over individual) of all variables involved. The coefficient of "lambda" is positive but insignificant that means that there is no sample selection bias (p-value = 0.664) in fixed effects estimation of log wage equation. Therefore, we choose FE estimation procedure without correction for selection as the most preferred one for the remainder of the analysis.
7 Table 5 presents the results from various specifications with respect to variables of interest. As Column (1) shows the average wage penalty for ever being a mother in Ukraine is 19.9% which is close 22% in the USA (Waldfogel 1995) . The wage penalty for each additional child is equal to 6.5%, (Column 2) which is again similar to the US estimate (Hill, 1979) .
Moreover, Column (3) shows that the effects of one child and two or more children in Ukraine are almost the same as in the US (Waldfogel 1995) . Column (4) of Table 5 summarizes the effects of children of different ages on mothers performance (Age of child is referring to the age of the youngest child in case of two or more). All coefficients for one child appear to be insignificant as well as jointly insignificant (p-value = 0.2272). This may be a sign of the evidence that the wage penalty for one child does not depend on the age of child. However for the case of two or more children the wage penalty is higher if the age of the youngest child is between 6 and 18, than for the case if smallest child is of preschool age.
8
Endogeneity concerns
As mentioned in the methodology section, our analysis may still be subject to endogeneity problem related to such human capital characteristics as experience and tenure (Korenman and Neumark 1992) . Unfortunately, this issue cannot be addressed with the ULMS data set. Korenman and Neumark (1992) implement their research for cross sectional data and suggested family background variables (occupation and education of parents, dummy of whether individual lived with parents at the age of 18, etc) as instruments. All proposed instruments are time invariant variables. Therefore they cannot be used for the panel data estimation. In case of panel data, such family background variables as husband's and partner's years of education, experience, and tenure can be used as instruments for female experience and tenure (Mroz, 1987) . However, it restricts the sample to only married females. In addition, in the ULMS data set information about partners is available only for half of married females.
8 Being concerned with the fact that the presence of children in the sample is constructed from the retrospective part of the ULMS without formal information on the presence of the child in the household over the period from 1997 to 2003, we have performed a test focusing only on the two years of the ULMS data. Unfortunately, FE estimations have not resulted in any meaningful estimates mainly due to the fact that over the course of one year very few women have given birth to a child. Therefore, while acknowledging the weakness of our approach, this is the best a researcher can do to address the question. 
Importance of education
An interesting question that arises after investigation of the wage penalty for motherhood is whether this penalty is the same for all females. Table 6 summarizes the results of fixed effect estimation of motherhood wage penalty for subsamples of women with different levels of education.
We find the highest wage penalty for those females whose highest level of education is high school or lower 15.8% and 22.6% for one child and two or more children respectively. This results contradicts the hypothesis that leaving the work does not impose high costs on low skilled workers (Andersnon, Binger and Krause 2002). However, it may be the case in Ukraine that for low skilled female workers it is hard to find a good paid job after spending some years out of the labor market and, therefore, they may suffer the most.
For those females who have complete vocational/professional education (the largest share of the sample) there is no significant penalty for one child and wage penalty for two or more children is 12.5%, which is slightly lower than for the entire sample. Females with at least bachelor's degree experience 11.4% wage penalty for one child and 16% for two or more children. These results differ somewhat from the previous literature. For example, Taniguchi (1999) find that education significantly reduces wage penalty for females who had at least 12 years of education, while Anderson, Binder and Krause (2002) show that college graduates experience higher costs of motherhood, due to higher opportunity costs of the time spent out of the labor market. However, this may be due to the fact that we are explicitly controlling for years out of the labor market. 4.3. Importance of timing of first birth Blackburn, Bloom and Neumark (1990) suggest that a delayed first childbirth is associated with higher wages. They investigate Mincerian wage equation adding age-at-first-birth variables as additional controls. However, adding age-at-first-birth variables are time invariant, therefore it can only be estimated using simple OLS which does not takes into account unobserved individual specific effects. Moreover, age at first birth is endogenous variable; females who earn higher wages tend to postpone first birth. Therefore, we use our preferred specification adding dummy variables for the age at first birth as controls (Taniguchi, 1999) . The obtained coefficient will give estimates of wage differentials between mothers who had her first birth at a certain age range and female who has no children. Figure 5 shows that the crude birth rate in Ukraine has been the highest among 20-24 year olds. But this is also the age group with the highest observed decline over the whole period.
While the crude birth rate among 25-29 year olds and 30-34 year olds is on the increase after year 2000. The distributions of age at first birth of the entire ULMS sample and by educational groups are shown in Figure 6 , the most frequent age at first birth is 19-22 years old. For the entire sample it appears to be that there is no wage penalty of each additional child if the childbirth is delayed till 25. Table 7 presents the results from the analysis of how the effect of children on wages differs depending on the age of the first birth. For females whose level of education is not higher than high school the effect of each child on wages is -12%, the most frequent age at first birth for such females is 19-21 years old ( Figure 6 ). For low educated females, those who had their first birth before age 20, suffer from 12% wage penalty, and females who postpone first birth slightly, suffer from 21% wage penalty. Further postponing of first birth is associated with no wage penalty and low-educated females who had their first birth after 30 years old experience even a 24 15% wage premium from becoming mothers. Females with vocational/professional education have their first birth slightly later (at the age 20-23, Figure 6 ) than just high school graduates and the wage penalty for each child appeared to be 6.1% which is twice lower than for low educated females. Timing of the first birth is significant only for the cases of becoming a mother before age 20 (-7.6%), for later childbearing this effect is insignificant and even positive for the late first birth. Therefore, for this group of females timing of the first birth clearly reduces wage penalty for motherhood. Finally, for females with high education, who most frequently have first birth later in their life than the two previous categories (see Figure 6 ), the wage penalty estimates suggest are virtually zero, if these women have their first child born when they are 25-29 year olds. This is most likely being the period shortly after they finish university. And the penalty is slightly higher for the late starters than for those who had the first child born after 20 but before 25, probably reflecting higher opportunity cost of time after graduation. 
Conclusions
This paper addresses very important policy question in the country with the lowest low fertility in Europe. Over the course of transition period, Ukraine has witnessed a number of policy debates on how to stop the population decline. One of the solution was to promote greater fertility, which has been addressed by the introduction and consequent increases in the baby bonuses. This paper is the first in Ukrainian context which shows that the direct cost of childbearing is not the only barrier to having more children, calling for policy options beyond the direct lump-sum payment conditional of child birth.
We find that even after controlling for human capital characteristics, i.e. effectively underestimating the effect of having a child, and the unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity, such as taste for children and individual relative productivity in the job market, motherhood wage penalty in Ukraine is comparable to the US one -probably the largest estimate in the world. In particular, the average wage penalty for being a mother in Ukraine is approximately 20%. Females with only one child earn 6.5% less than females without children, and females with two or more children earn approximately 13.3% less. Thus, the wage penalty for each additional child is approximately 6.5%. This is close to the US estimates by Waldfogel (1997 Waldfogel ( , 1998a Waldfogel ( , 1998b . Marital status was not found to be the determinant of female's lower wages in Ukraine even after controlling for individual specific time invariant unobserved heterogeneity.
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The evidence suggests that the wage penalty for motherhood is different for females with different levels of education, and is the highest for low skilled females. This contradicts previous findings for other countries, which may be related to the fact that the human capital accumulated through the period of Socialism may be receiving a different pay-off over the course of transition and after. In spite of this fact, females with vocational/professional education experienced the lowest wage penalty. However, females with high education have the highest opportunity costs of each year of being out of labor market, which is consistent with previous findings by Anderson, Binder and Krause (2002) .
Timing of the first childbirth reduces family wage gap, and there is a connection to education level in this regard. Thus, low educated females receive 15% wage premium if they delay motherhood until the age of 30, and suffers the most if they give first birth between 20 and 25 years old. The wage penalty for motherhood for females with vocational/professional education disappears if they have first birth after age 20. For highly educated females, the evidence is mixed because the effects of high education and timing have different directions.
These findings from a country with generous family support policies and existing antidiscrimination laws provide strong evidence that these policies are not enforced. If the government is concerned with the lowest low fertility, then the baby bonuses are not the only measure it has to pursue. Each additional year out of the labor force has a wage penalty of 4%, which is very significant given the 16% premium for a university degree. These suggests that maybe initiatives tackling the maintenance of human capital while taking care of the child are needed. Existence of the direct effect of a child on wages after controlling for human capital characteristics maybe related to two things, both of which can be dealt with to certain degree by respective policies. One is the effort-allocation story, and this can be improved by greater availability and better quality of child care facilities. The other -(most likely statistical) 27 discrimination and prejudice against women with children, which can be dealt with better enforced affirmative action laws and maybe the promotion campaign targeting employers and managers. In all these case, more research is needed to identify the appropriate mix of policies. 10 Number of newborns from mothers younger than 15 and older than 49 are included into these groups. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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